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Many	governments	have	managed	to	control	their	COVID-19	outbreak	with	a	simple	message:	keep	
the	effective	'R	number'	R<1	to	prevent	widespread	contagion	and	flatten	the	curve.	This	raises	the	
question	whether	a	similar	policy	could	control	dangerous	online	'infodemics'	of	information,	
misinformation	and	disinformation1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13.	Here	we	show,	using	multi-platform	data	
from	the	COVID-19	infodemic,	that	its	online	spreading	instead	encompasses	a	different	dynamical	
regime	where	communities	and	users	within	and	across	independent	platforms,	sporadically	form	
temporary	active	links	on	similar	timescales	to	the	viral	spreading.	This	allows	material	that	might	
have	died	out,	to	evolve	and	even	mutate14,15,16.	This	has	enabled	niche	networks	that	were	already	
successfully	spreading	hate	and	anti-vaccination	material,	to	rapidly	become	global	super-
spreaders	of	narratives	featuring	fake	COVID-19	treatments,	anti-Asian	sentiment	and	conspiracy	
theories.	We	derive	new	tools	that	incorporate	these	coupled	social-viral	dynamics,	including	an	
online	R,	to	help	prevent	infodemic	spreading	at	all	scales:	from	spreading	across	platforms	(e.g.	
Facebook,	4Chan)	to	spreading	within	a	given	subpopulation,	or	community,	or	topic.	By	accounting	
for	similar	social	and	viral	timescales,	the	same	mathematical	theory	also	offers	a	quantitative	
description	of	other	unconventional	infection	profiles	such	as	rumors	spreading	in	financial	
markets	and	colds	spreading	in	schools.		Despite	the	many	physical	differences	between	a	piece	of	information	on	social	media	and	a	biological	virus,	the	term	'infodemic'	adopted	by	the	World	Health	Organization	is	attractive	since	it	suggests	importing	policies	from	epidemiology1,17,18,19,20	Starbird	et	al.'s	continually	updated	literature	review3	spells	out	the	dangers	of	infodemics	of	online	information,	misinformation,	and	disinformation21,22,23,24,25,26.	The	current	infodemic	now	extends	beyond	COVID-19	topics	such	as	lockdowns,	protests	and	masks	to	include	the	2020	U.S.	elections.	The	cross-platform	data	that	we	have	compiled	of	such	COVID-related	material	from	Dec	2019-June	2020,	shows	that	the	online	activity	('infection')	at	all	scales	is	typically	very	different	to	the	single-peak	infection	profile	and	diffusive	spreading	predicted	by	standard	epidemiological	models	(Figs.	1,2,	Extended	Data	Figs.	3	and	5).	Hence,	there	is	a	need	to	develop	a	quantitative	science	of	such	'infodemiology'	to	guide	any	adaptation	of	policies	from	epidemiology.		Figure	1a	illustrates	a	key	online	mechanism	that	is	essentially	absent	from	offline	epidemics:	online	communities	such	as	Facebook	Pages	or	VKontakte	Groups,	each	of	which	is	a	cluster	(i.e.	node)	with	up	to	a	million	or	more	members,	frequently	form	links	to	other	online	communities	both	across	and	within	platforms	on	a	similar	timescale	to	the	effective	infection	and	recovery	times	for	viral	material,	e.g.	a	few	days.	When	combined	with	occasional	link-breaking,	either	intentional	or	by	moderators,	these	link	dynamics	generate	a	perpetual	reclustering-of-clusters	within	and	across	platforms	and	hence	across	languages	and	continents27.	This	means	that	although	interest	in	a	particular	piece	of	(mis/dis)information	may	be	waning	within	a	given	community,	it	can	get	injected	into	new	communities	where	it	can	revive,	evolve	and	mutate.	Crucially,	no	continuous	path	need	exist	at	any	given	time	across	the	entire	social	media	multiverse.	Instead,	paths	that	are	piecewise	in	time	can	open	up	from	sporadic	sequences	of	links.	Extended	Data	Figure	1	gives	an	explicit	example.	This	is	akin	to	crossing	a	wide	river	by	serendipitous	positioning	of	a	short	plank	to	bridge	adjacent	rocks.	An	immediate	consequence	is	that	subnetworks	that	were	already	adept	at	spreading	contentious	material	under	these	conditions	prior	to	2020,	including	those	for	health	misinformation	(Fig.	2a)	and	hate	(Fig.	1a),	acted	as	early	global	super-spreaders	for	COVID-19	
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narratives	(Fig.	1a	inset),	including	anti-Asian	racism	and	dis/misinformation	about	COVID-19	causes,	cures	and	vaccines.		
	
Figure	1:	Transient	pathways	within	and	across	platforms	for	spreading.	a:	Each	node	is	a	cluster	of	members	(e.g.	Gab	
community).	For	simplicity,	we	only	show	clusters	whose	narratives	focus	around	hate	(black	circles)	and	clusters	they	
link	into	(no	rings),	since	these	became	a	strong	conduit	for	COVID-19	misinformation	from	December	2019	onwards	
(inset,	top).	Snapshot	is	from	the	start	of	COVID-19	infodemic	(Jan	2020):	it	involves	~10,000,000	users	across	languages	
and	continents	who	formed	themselves	into	~6,000	inter-linked	clusters.	Small	green	square	shows	example	of	a	
community	that	suddenly	emerged	and	trafficked	COVID-19	misinformation	(see	Methods).	b:	Infection	profiles	of	COVID-
19	activity	feature	multiple	peaks,	unlike	standard	epidemiology.	Values	are	non-zero	but	too	small	to	see	on	this	scale	
prior	to	the	major	infodemic	onset	in	mid-January.	Solid	black	curves	show	the	theory's	predictions	(SI)	without	
employing	any	parameter	optimization	to	improve	fitting.	Left	two	theory	curves	are	identical,	just	rescaled	in	magnitude,	
and	so	are	the	right	two	theory	curves:	the	only	difference	in	parameter	values	is	left	two	theory	curves	have	a	recovery	
time	per	cluster	which	is	0.5	times	that	for	the	right	two	theory	curves.	These	profiles	illustrate	how	time-dependent	links	
allow	the	'infection'	to	die	down	but	then	re-emerge.		
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The	Supplementary	Information	(SI)	details	our	simple	approach	to	incorporating	these	missing	social-viral	dynamics	into	standard	epidemiology,	starting	from	fundamental	equations.	The	resulting	theory's	predictions	are	in	good	agreement	with	full-scale	computer	simulations	(Extended	Data	Fig.	2)	and	produce	infection	profiles	consistent	with	those	observed	across	all	online	scales	(e.g.	Fig.	1b	and	Extended	Data	Fig.	3).	Solving	these	equations	yields	a	new	online	'R	number'	!!"#$"% 	and	a	tipping	point	condition	to	prevent	spreading	across	"	online	universes	(e.g.	"	social	media	platforms):		 !!"#$"% = $∑ "!""'!"#!,"%&∑ "!(!#!%& % )!)' < 1	 	 	 (1)		where	all	the	quantities	on	the	right	side	of	Eq.	1	are	physical	quantities	that	can	be	counted	directly	from	the	data,	e.g.	Fig.	1a.	($ 	and	(* 	are	the	fraction	of	clusters	(e.g.	Facebook	Pages)	in	universes	(platforms)	)	and	*	respectively.	In	Fig.	1a,	for	example,	($ 	for	)=VKontakte	is	the	fraction	of	red	nodes.		+$*+,	is	the	typical	(technically,	the	average)	time	it	takes	for	a	link	to	form	between	a	cluster	in	)	and	a	cluster	in	*,	e.g.		if	)	and	*	are	both	on	Facebook	(FB),	a	link	is	created	when	FB	Page	A	(i.e.	cluster	A)	'likes'	FB	Page	B	(i.e.	cluster	B)	and	hence	content	is	more	likely	to	be	shared,	though	Eq.	1	also	applies	to	other	link	definitions.	Our	data	shows	this	is	on	the	scale	of	days.	,$+,	is	the	typical	time	it	takes	for	the	links	of	a	cluster	in	universe	)	to	be	removed.	- = .$ .-⁄ 	is	the	contact	ratio	and	it	is	independent	of	the	cluster	network:	.$+,	is	the	typical	time	it	takes	for	a	cluster	to	pass	a	piece	of	material	to	another	cluster	to	which	it	is	already	linked,	which	our	data	shows	is	also	on	the	scale	of	days,	while	.-+,	is	the	typical	time	it	takes	until	new	content	added	to	a	cluster	does	not	mention	that	material.	In	the	mass-action	limit,	!!"#$"% → [2].$ .-⁄ 	giving	the	familiar	R	number	for	a	real	virus	in	a	contact	population	size	2,	which	is	equivalent	to	the	average	number	of	people	infected	by	each	infected	person.	Since	Eq.	1	is	derived	mathematically,	not	by	empirical	fit	or	statistical	scaling,	it	can	be	generalized	in	a	systematic	way	to	address	different	what-if	scenarios.			Equation	1	has	a	variety	of	consequences	for	potential	policy-making:		First,	Eq.	1	takes	on	a	transparent	form	when	the	policy	focus	is	on	policing	pairs	of	subpopulations,	e.g.	a	pair	of	platforms	such	as	Facebook	(FB)	and	a	platform	(A)	that	FB	may	not	control.	If	both	platforms	have	similar	gross	features,	+./	./~+11 ≡ +	and	+./	1~+1	./ ≡ 6+,	hence	Eq.	1	predicts	that	Facebook	could	prevent	spreading	by	ensuring	the	fraction	of	inter-platform	links	6 < 62-$3 ,	where	62-$3 = 7(()"()4(*"*5'"()"* 8 ,6 + 71 − ,5"()"*8	 	.	 (2)	62-$3	vs.	1 -⁄ 	is	a	convenient	straight-line	graph	and	1 -⁄ 	is	independent	of	the	network.	Equation	2	means	that	Facebook,	for	example,	can	increase	,./	to	raise	62-$3	above	6,	or	directly	reduce	6	by	reducing	inter-platform	links.	Hence	it	avoids	the	need	for	blanket	'social	distancing'	between	Facebook	and	platform	A,	or	'quarantining'	of	platform	A,	and	hence	avoids	claims	of	over-policing.			Second,	Eq.	1	applies	at	other	scales	simply	by	changing	the	specification	of	'cluster'	and	'universe',	e.g.	to	prevent	spreading	between	a	subpopulation	on	Telegram	that	share	adult	or	borderline	extremist	content,	and	a	subpopulation	of	vulnerable	individuals	on	Facebook	(e.g.	minors);	or	to	prevent	spreading	of	COVID	narratives	within	a	platform	(e.g.	Facebook)	from	anti-vaccination	communities	to	mainstream	communities	(e.g.	pet-lovers)33.	It	also	applies	to	spreading	within	a	single	community	by	classifying	nodes	as	individual	users	who	then	form	a	cluster	(i.e.	single	community	such	as	a	Facebook	Page).	Since	they	tend	to	join	and	leave	individually,	the	mathematics	reduces	primarily	to	monomer	dynamics.	Similarly	anomalous	infection	profiles	emerge	(see	Extended	Data	Fig.	3	and	SI	for	details).			
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Figure	2:	Spreading	within	platform	and	topic.	a:	Illustration	of	spreading	of	COVID-19	information,	misinformation	and	
disinformation	between	anti-vaccination	(red),	pro-vaccination	(blue)	and	'undecided'	(green)	clusters	(each	node	is	a	
Facebook	Page).	Each	subpopulation	shows	similarly	anomalous	infection	profiles	to	Fig.	1b	and	are	unlike	standard	
epidemiological	diffusive	spreading,	e.g.	the	high	initial	spread	within	pro-vaccination	subpopulation	then	decays	before	
re-emerging.	b:	Spreading	of	a	single	topic	on	same	network	as	panel	a,	shown	at	intervals	of	2	weeks,	is	also	unlike	
standard	epidemiological	diffusive	spreading.	This	topic	was	identified	using	dynamic	LDA	machine-learning34	as	having	
the	fastest	rising	coherence	score	(see	SI).	Word	clouds	illustrate	how	this	topic's	time-dependent	word	weightings	evolve	
and	the	topic	itself	mutates	toward	protests,	lockdowns	and	then	reopenings	(red	rings).			Third,	Eq.	1		predicts	the	online	herd	immunity	required	to	prevent	spreading	for	policy	schemes	that	propose	to	'innoculate'	online35.	The	minimum	fraction	of	clusters	that	if	innoculated	will	prevent	an	infodemic,	is	estimated	to	be	;1 − !!"#$"%+,/8<.	Hence	!!"#$"%=10	means	at	least	54%	of	clusters	require	innoculation,	which	is	similar	to	the	value	we	obtain	using	computer	simulations.		Fourth,	Eq.	1	says	that	even	if	.$ .-⁄ > 1	and	there	is	no	such	online	'vaccine',	the	prefactor	can	be	adjusted	by	changing	the	link	forming	and	breaking	timescales,	to	force	!!"#$"% < 1	and	hence	prevent	the	infodemic.	Even	if	.$ .-⁄ 	is	not	accurately	known,	reducing	the	prefactor	will	still	lower	the	risk.	
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	Fifth,	Eq.	1	allows	for	different	types	of	material	to	have	different	infectiousness,	e.g.	COVID-19	misinformation	vs.	racism,	by	having	different	contact	ratio	(- = .$ .-⁄ )	values.	The	same	is	true	regarding	its	level	of	truthfulness,	e.g.	fake	news	may	have	a	higher	-.	Given	the	same	network	dynamics,	an	infodemic	can	therefore	occur	in	one	case	but	not	another.			Sixth,	the	physical	variables	in	the	prefactor	in	Eq.	1	do	not	need	to	be	the	same	before	and	after	the	viral	material	is	introduced,	so	Eq.	1	allows	for	the	system	as	a	whole	to	subsequently	react	or	adapt.	Likewise	by	allowing	a	dependence	on	the	contact	ratio	(.$ .-⁄ )	or	time,	Eq.	1	can	account	for	material	that	is	so	infectious	that	it	rewires	the	system	as	it	spreads,	or	it	mutates	as	it	spreads	as	in	Fig.	2b.		Seventh,	Eq.	1	applies	for	other	definitions	of	links	between	clusters.	The	links	forming	or	breaking	between	a	pair	of	clusters	may	be	based	on	the	time-dependent	correlations,	or	the	amount	of	material	shared,	or	the	topic	or	nature	of	its	content	(e.g.	videos	vs.	text)	or	common	membership.			Eighth,	since	the	underlying	mathematical	analysis	centers	around	the	derivation	of	the	probability	of	links	existing	at	a	specific	time,	generalizations	of	Eq.	1	for	other	choices	of	infection	process	beyond	SIR	(Susceptible-Infected-Recovered)	follow	very	similar	mathematics.		Ninth,	Eq.	1	accounts	for	the	empirical	observation	that	while	viral	material	can	appear	isolated	and	largely	eradicated	on	a	given	platform,	it	may	have	moved	though	inter-cluster	links	to	other	platforms	where	it	revives	before	later	re-emerging	on	the	original	platform.	Moderators	reviewing	blue	clusters	in	Fig.	1a	might	conclude	that	they	have	largely	rid	their	platform	of	certain	unwanted	material	in	certain	clusters,	only	to	see	it	re-emerge	at	a	later	date	in	completely	different	clusters. 	Tenth,	this	mathematical	generalization	of	standard	epidemiology	also	produces	profiles	similar	to	other	real-world	systems	that	have	an	interplay	between	social	and	viral	timescales,	e.g.	online	rumors	in	financial	markets	and	contagious	diseases	(e.g.	colds)	within	schools	(see	Extended	Data	Fig.	4).			There	are	limitations	to	our	study.	The	'infection'	terminology	will	always	be	an	imperfect	analogy.	While	better	fits	to	the	profile	shapes	can	be	obtained	by	parameterizing	the	variables	in	Eq.	1,	and	setting-specific	effects	may	contribute	to	particular	profile	anomalies,	our	focus	is	instead	on	providing	a	benchmark	scientific	framework	using	a	minimal,	parsimonious	description36.	Other	social	dynamics	that	are	routine,	e.g.	nightly	sleep,	should	average	out	globally.	We	have	not	followed	specific	pieces	of	information,	e.g.	the	Plandemic	movie,	because	our	focus	is	on	the	system	level.	Our	mathematical	formulae	are	approximations,	however	they	agree	with	full-scale	computer	simulations	and	reproduce	key	features	of	the	empirical	profiles.	There	will	be	errors	in	estimating	the	physical	variables	in	Eq.	1,	however	these	can	be	combined	to	give	a	useful	error	range	for	!!"#$"% .		People	may	be	members	of	multiple	clusters,	however	our	prior	work	found	that	only	a	small	percentage	are	actually	active	across	multiple	clusters.	Some	people	may	avoid	certain	material	while	for	others	it	may	incite	them37,	however	these	two	types	could	be	considered	crudely	as	two	subpopulations	in	Eq.	1	and	2.	Clandestine	agencies	may	contribute	to	spreading:	however	the	decentralized	nature	of	Fig.	1a	makes	any	central	control	unlikely.	For	example,	for	material	with	a	hate	component,	we	only	found	a	small	portion	of	clusters	linking	to	Kremlin-affiliated	domains	and	these	links	accounted	for	<0.5%	of	all	posts	shared.	This	is	consistent	with	claims	that	in-built	communities	(e.g.	Facebook	Pages)	self-police	for	trolls	and	bots,	as	opposed	to	Twitter	where	there	is	no	such	in-built	community	structure.		
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Methods	The	SI	provides	the	derivation	and	analysis	of	the	mathematical	equations	and	our	methods	for	obtaining	the	empirical	dynamical	networks	of	clusters	and	classifying	their	content	(e.g.	Fig.	1a,	2a)	which	follow	our	prior	works38,39,40,41.	Each	cluster	(i.e.	node)	in	Fig.	1a	is	an	interest-based	online	community	(e.g.	Facebook	Page	or	VKontakte	Group)	and	each	link	is	a	hyperlink	that	appears	between	them.	We	do	not	consider	Twitter	since	it	does	not	have	the	in-built	cluster	tools	of	Facebook	etc.:	such	clusters	are	known	to	facilitate	coordination	and	play	a	greater	role	in	nurturing.	Figure	1a	includes	the	mainstream	platforms	Facebook,	VKontakte,	and	Instagram,	that	have	and	enforce	content	policies,	and	fringe	platforms	with	minimal	content	policies:	Gab,	Telegram,	and	4Chan.	Figure	1b	shows	typical	output	from	our	model	with	the	same	values	+$* = 0.95,	,$ = 0.05,	.$ = 0.05	for	all	four	panels.	For	4Chan	and	Telegram	.- = 0.01;	for	Gab	and	Facebook	.- = 0.005.	All	four	fits	are	with	these	same	two	model	profile	outputs	suitably	scaled.	Output	is	smoothed	over	timepoints	like	the	empirical	data	which	is	collected	daily.	All	but	one	node	in	Fig.	1a	is	plotted	using	the	ForceAtlas2	algorithm,	which	simulates	a	physical	system	where	nodes	(clusters)	repel	each	other	while	links	act	as	springs,	and	nodes	that	are	connected	through	a	link	attract	each	other.	Hence	nodes	(clusters)	closer	to	each	other	have	more	highly	interconnected	local	environments	while	those	farther	apart	do	not.	The	exception	is	Gab	group	407*	(“Chinese	Coronavirus”,	https://gab.com/groups/407*,	small	green	square	in	Fig.	1a)	which	was	manually	placed	to	facilitate	visibility.	It	was	created	in	early	2020	with	a	focus	on	discussing	the	COVID19	pandemic:	however,	it	immediately	mixed	COVID-19	fake	news	and	hate,	as	well	as	conspiratorial	content.	In	Fig.	1b,	the	vertical	scale	is	only	shown	on	one	plot	for	clarity,	but	the	others	have	somewhat	similar	scales	(see	Extended	Data	Fig.	5).	Our	dynamic	LDA	machine	learning	process	and	analysis	(Fig.	2b)	is	described	in	the	SI.	
	
Data	Availability:	Dataset	provided	with	the	Supplementary	Information	(SI).	All	computer	programs	are	given	in	the	SI	or	are	described	fully	in	previous	publications	(see	references).	
Author	Contributions:	All	authors	contributed	to	the	research	design,	the	analysis,	and	writing	the	paper.		
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